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We analyse how the internal organisation of ﬁrms aﬀects the
correspondence between private and social incentives for horizon-
tal merger. Applying a model of endogenous merger formation in
at h r e e - ﬁrm asymmetric Cournot industry, we contrast the cases
of entrepreneurial and managerial ﬁrms. The use of strategic del-
egation increases both the probability that a merger takes place
and the likelihood that the ‘wrong’ type of merger is undertaken,
from a viewpoint of social welfare. This suggests that managerial
delegation increases the scope for antitrust policy.
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1I n t r o d u c t i o n
In this paper we discuss how the internal organisation of ﬁrms - more
speciﬁcally the use of managerial delegation - aﬀects incentives for hor-
izontal merger in asymmetric industries, where ﬁrms diﬀer in cost eﬃ-
ciency. Such mergers do not only reduce competition; they also generate
eﬃciency gains.1 Particular attention is thus directed towards the cor-
respondence between private and social merger incentives. By using a
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1The trade-oﬀ between reduced competition and the realisation of eﬃciency gains
in a social evaluation of mergers was identiﬁed and formalised by Williamson (1968),
and has since been elaborated on in great detail by e.g. Farrell and Shapiro (1990),
Levin (1990) and McAfee and Williams (1992).
1model of endogenous merger formation, our aim is to provide a better
understanding of how potential discrepancies between private and social
merger incentives - and thus the scope for antitrust policy - are related
to the use of managerial delegation.
The separation of ownership and management in large corporations
challenges the validity of the traditional assumption of a ﬁrm as a single
proﬁt-maximising agent. The idea that ﬁrms strive towards other goals
than proﬁt maximisation, which has a long tradition in the so-called
behavioural theory of the ﬁrm,2 has been reconsidered in the literature
on strategic delegation, which was pioneered by Vickers (1985), Fersht-
man (1985), Fershtman and Judd (1987) and Sklivas (1987). In general,
imperfect product market competition is a suﬃcient condition for own-
e r st op r o v i d et h e i rm a n a g e r sw i t hi n c e n t i v e sw h i c hd e v i a t ef r o mp r o ﬁt
maximisation.
The idea of strategic delegation has obviously important implica-
tions for the understanding of industrial organisation in general. How-
ever, the amount of theoretical work on the role of delegation in merger
processes is surprisingly scant. Two related papers are González-Maestre
and López-Cuñat (2001) and Ziss (2001), who consider how managerial
delegation aﬀects the proﬁtability of horizontal mergers in a symmet-
ric Cournot oligopoly, and ﬁnd that merger proﬁtability is generally
increased.3 There are, however, no eﬃciency gains from a merger in
these studies, so the relationship between private and social incentives
for merger is not an issue.
In the present paper we consider a three-ﬁrm Cournot industry in
which mergers are formed through bargaining between owners at the
outset of the game. The eﬀects of managerial delegation on merger
incentives are assessed by comparing the cases of entrepreneurial and
managerial ﬁrms. In order to make the distinction between social and
private merger incentives an interesting one, we assume that a merger
always entails an eﬃciency gain. The literature on horizontal mergers
suggests several potential sources for eﬃciency-enhancing mergers. The
most commonly indicated source of eﬃciency gains is the presence of
cost asymmetries.4 If the ﬁrms in a certain industry produce at dif-
ferent marginal costs, mergers can yield rationalisation gains through
2See e.g. Baumol (1958), Simon (1964) and Williamson (1964).
3Faulí-Oller and Motta (1996) also study the eﬀect of delegation on merger prof-
itability. However, this is done under the assumption that managers also make
takeover decisions. In the present paper, as well as in the other related studies,
the merger process is controlled by owners.
4For some recent studies of horizontal merger in asymmetric industries, see Barros
(1998), Smythe et al. (2000), Kabiraj and Lee (2000), Stennek (2001), Faulí-Oller
(2002).
2re-allocation of production from high-cost to low-cost plants.5 We also
adopt this idea by assuming that the ﬁrms have constant, but diﬀerent,
marginal costs of production.
Ruling out the possibility of merger to monopoly by assumption,
we ﬁnd that the correspondence between private and social incentives
for merger is highly dependent on whether or not owners use strate-
g i cd e l e g a t i o n .I nt h ec a s eo fe n t r e p r e n e u r i a lﬁrms, the merger process
produces the socially most preferred ownership structure if the degree
of cost asymmetry is either suﬃciently low, or suﬃciently high. In the
delegation regime, on the other hand, there is always a conﬂict between
private and social merger incentives, and the merger process will actu-
ally produce the socially least preferred ownership structure if the cost
s t r u c t u r ei ss u ﬃciently asymmetric.
These results are due to the fact that delegation changes the merger
incentives in two diﬀerent ways. Firstly, a merger is always proﬁtable in
the delegation regime, even if there are no eﬃciency gains. Secondly, the
merger process is to a larger extent motivated by the quest for market
power, relative to cost-saving motivations. This means that the use
of delegation not only increases the probability that a merger will take
place, but it also increases the likelihood that the ‘wrong’ type of merger
will be undertaken. Our results therefore suggest that the use of strategic
delegation increases the scope for antitrust policy. This is the main
message of the paper.
T h er e s to ft h ep a p e ri so r g a n i s e di nt h ef o l l o w i n gw a y .I nt h en e x t
section we present the basic ingredients of the model. In section 3 we ex-
plain the assumptions of the endogenous merger process, which is based
on Horn and Persson (2001), whereas section 4 is devoted to the analysis
of the relationship between market structures and delegation incentives.
In section 5 we solve the model and derive the equilibrium ownership
structure for the cases of entrepreneurial and managerial ﬁrms, respec-
tively. The equilibrium outcome of the game is then related to the social
ranking of ownership structures in section 6. Finally, some concluding
remarks are oﬀered in section 7.
5A merger may also be an instrument to obtain transmission of cost-reducing
technology (see e.g. Faulí-Oller and Sandonis, 2002). It is also possible that a
merger creates additional synergies. For instance, Perry and Porter (1985) introduce
as p e c i ﬁc asset that reduces marginal costs through mergers. In another line of
reasoning, Lommerud et. al (2002) suggest that a downstream merger may create
variable cost synergies through an improved bargaining position vis-á-vis upstream
input suppliers.
32 The model
Consider an industry with three initial owners of ﬁrms producing a ho-
mogeneous good, which is sold at the market clearing price, given by the
inverse demand function
p(Q)=a − Q, (1)
where Q =
P3
i=1 qi is the total output of the ﬁrms in the industry. The
mode of competition is Cournot, and we also assume that entry to the
industry is restricted, due to some ﬁrm-speciﬁc ownership advantages of
the incumbents.
The production technologies of the ﬁrms are represented by constant
marginal costs of production, ci,a n dt h eﬁrms diﬀer in eﬃciency, so
that c1 <c 2 <c 3. To simplify the analysis we make the diﬀerences
in eﬃciency symmetrically distributed by assuming that the marginal
production cost of ﬁrm i is given by
ci =( i − 1)c, i =1 ,2,3. (2)
The parameter c is then a direct measure of cost asymmetry in the
industry.6 In order to make sure that the least eﬃcient ﬁrm is always
active in any possible ownership structure, we assume that c is below a
critical value c.7
We want to distinguish between the cases of entrepreneurial and
managerial ﬁrms. If ﬁrms are entrepreneurial, each owner makes the
output decision herself. On the other hand, if ﬁrms are managerial, each
owner delegates the output decision to a manager. In either case, owners
a r ea s s u m e dt ob ep r o ﬁt-maximisers.
In the delegation regime, each manager chooses the ﬁrm’s output to
maximise his personal payoﬀ, given by an individual contract provided
by the owner of the ﬁrm. Owners receive the resulting proﬁts, whereas
managers are rewarded according to their contracts. Owners are able
to assess the performance of their managers according to two readily
observable indicators: proﬁts (π)a n ds a l e s( q). The incentive contracts
are speciﬁed so that manager i has an incentive to maximise a func-
tion φi (πi,q i). Following the established practice in the literature on
managerial delegation, we specify φi to be a linear combination of its
arguments, and given by
φi (πi,q i)=θiπi +( 1− θi)qi. (3)
6This particular speciﬁcation of cost asymmetry is a simpliﬁcation of Barros
(1998).
7The subsequent analysis demonstrates that c = a
11.
4Manager i can maximise his payoﬀ by choosing the value of qi which
maximises φi (·),s oo w n e ri can determine her manager’s incentives by
choosing θi.8
For delegation contracts to be eﬀective as commitment devices, they
must be public information9 and irreversible.10 However, as observed by
González-Maestre and López-Cuñat (2001), the commitment problem
can be overcome by interpreting the model as one where an owner choose
her manager’s type, rather than contract. With this interpretation, a
manager’s type is represented by the parameter θi,w h e r eal o wv a l u eo f
θ means that the manager is an ‘aggressive’ type with strong preferences
for sales.
The game is characterised by the following sequence of play:
Stage 1: The equilibrium ownership structure of the industry is de-
termined through bargaining between the owners.
Stage 2: In the case of entrepreneurial ﬁrms, the owners set quantities
and the game ends. In the case of managerial ﬁrms, the owners choose
incentive contracts for their managers.
Stage 3: Managers set quantities.
3 Endogenous merger formation
When making predictions about the equilibrium ownership structure in
this industry we exclude the possibility of merger to monopoly. Besides
being a less interesting industry structure, it is also reasonable to assume
that complete monopolisation would not gain permission from antitrust
authorities.
To introduce some notation, let an ownership structure Mi be a par-
tition of the set {1,2,3} of owners into coalitions. When we exclude
complete monopolisation, we are left with the following possible owner-
ship structures: M0 = {1,2,3}, MA = {{1,2},3}, MB = {{1,3},2}
and MC = {1,{2,3}}.
In order to make some predictions about which ownership structure
will emerge as an equilibrium outcome of the game, we will make use
of an approach developed by Horn and Persson (2001), which treats the
merger process as a cooperative game of coalition-formation, where the
players are free to communicate and write binding contracts.
8With this speciﬁcation, manager i’s actual payoﬀ could be given by αi + βiφi,
where αi and βi are some constants with βi > 0.
9Fershtman and Judd (1987) argue that incentive contracts are more costly to
change than prices or production, so they will be unaltered for a substantial amount
of time and are therefore likely to be observed by rivals.
10Katz (1991) shows that the commitment value of delegation is present even under
private information and renegotiation, provided that delegation is imperfect and
renegotiation occurs under incomplete information.
5Without going into details about the theoretical foundations, the
approach involves a comparison of any two possible ownership structures
Mi and Mj,w h e r eMi is said to dominate Mj (Mi dom Mj)i ft h e
combined proﬁts of the decisive group of owners are larger in Mi than in
Mj.T h edecisive group of owners are the owners that are expected to
be able to inﬂuence whether Mi will be formed instead of Mj,a n dv i c e
versa. We do not allow payments between coalition, so owners belonging
to identical coalitions in the two structures cannot aﬀect whether Mj
will be formed instead of Mi, but all remaining owners can inﬂuence
this choice and are thus decisive.11
Consider the ownership structures M0 and MA.I nt h i sc a s eo w n e r
3 stands alone in both structures, so the decisive owners are the merger
participants in MA, i.e. owners 1 and 2. Now consider instead MA
and MB.F o r MA to dominate MB it is not enough that owners 1
and 2 prefer MA over MB. If owner 3 is adversely aﬀected by the
formation of MA, this owner may want to persuade owner 1 to form MB
instead, by oﬀering a large share of the surplus in this structure. Thus,
all three owners are decisive, and the dominance relation is determined
by a comparison of total industry proﬁts in the two ownership structures.
Finally, the solution concept is the core. Those structures that are
in the core (i.e. the structures that are undominated)a r ed e ﬁned as
Equilibrium Ownership Structures (EOS).
4 Market structures and managerial incentives
With asymmetric production costs, a merger between ﬁrms i and j im-
plies that the merged entity can produce at marginal costs equal to
min{ci,c j}. Thus, a merger always entails a rationalisation gain since
production can be re-allocated from a high-cost to a low-cost plant.12
Consequently, there are two diﬀerent motivations for merger in this
model, namely increased market power and a rationalisation of produc-
tion. Note also that MB and MC are equivalent in terms of market
structure, since both ownership structures are characterised by a duopoly
with a cost diﬀerence between the ﬁrms equal to c.W ec a nt h u si d e n -
tify three diﬀerent possible market structures: the decentralised struc-
ture (M0), a duopoly with ’small’ cost diﬀerences (MB or MC)a n da
duopoly with ’large’ cost diﬀerences (MA).
In order to characterise the equilibrium outcome of the diﬀerent pos-
sible ownership structures, we introduce the following notation: sub-
11See Horn and Persson (2001) for a formal deﬁnition of decisive owners.
12If cost diﬀerences are due to the existence of superior technologies that can be
fully transferred through a merger, the merged ﬁrm can also be viewed as a multiplant
ﬁrm, operating the two former ﬁrms as plants.
6script i+j refers to the merged entity in case of a merger between ﬁrms
i and j,w h e r e a ss u p e r s c r i p t se and m refer to the cases of entrepreneurial
ﬁrms and managerial ﬁrms, respectively.
As usual, the equilibrium outcome in each ownership structure is
found by using a backwards induction argument. Let us ﬁrst deﬁne the
relevant proﬁt functions. The proﬁt of a single owner i is given by13
πi =[ p(Q) − (i − 1)c]qi, (4)
whereas if owners i and j decide to merge, they earn a combined proﬁt
of
πi+j =[ p(Q) − min{(i − 1)c,(j − 1)c}]qi+j. (5)
Production is determined at the last stage of the game. In the delega-
tion regime, equilibrium output of ﬁrm i is partly determined by manage-
rial incentives (or preferences), and given by a function qm
i (θi,θ−i,a,c).
In the case of entrepreneurial ﬁrms, equilibrium output of ﬁrm i is solely
determined by market size and the degree of cost asymmetry in the
industry, and given by qe
i (a,c).N o t et h a tqm
i = qe
i for θi = θ−i =1 .
If ﬁrms are managerial, the optimal incentive contracts are deter-
mined by proﬁt maximisation at the second stage of the game. Inserting
qm
i (θi,θ−i,a,c) into the proﬁt functions, the simultaneous proﬁtm a x -
imisation problem yields an optimal incentive contract for ﬁrm i which
is characterised by a function θi (a,c).
The eﬀects of merger in a simple homogeneous goods Cournot oligopoly
with entrepreneurial ﬁrms are reasonably well known. In this section we
will therefore concentrate on how equilibrium managerial incentives are
aﬀected by the market structure of the industry.14
Diﬀerent ownership structures yield diﬀerent incentives for strategic
delegation, so a merger is always accompanied by new incentive contracts
for managers in all ﬁrms.15 Let θi (Mj) denote the optimal contract of
owner i in ownership structure Mj. The equilibrium outcomes in the
diﬀerent ownership structures are then characterised by
θi (M0)=
5
5+a +( 1 9− 10i)c





13For simplicity, the payoﬀ to managers is suppressed in the proﬁte x p r e s s i o n s .
14The explicit expressions for the equilibrium outcome in each ownership structure,
in terms of output and proﬁts, are given in Appendix A.
15With the alternative interpretation of strategic delegation, an industrial restruc-














We observe that θi (Mj) ∈ (0,1) for all i and j. Strategic delega-
tion under Cournot competition implies that managers’ payoﬀsd e p e n d
positively on sales in equilibrium. This further implies that the use
of managerial contracts makes the equilibrium within each ownership
s t r u c t u r em o r ec o m p e t i t i v e ,c o m p a red with the non-delegation game.
More important for the present analysis, though, is the relationship
between relative production costs and managerial incentives. From (6)-
(10) we see that θi < θj within each ownership structure if ci <c j.
Thus, the owners of more cost-eﬃcient ﬁrms will provide their managers
with higher relative sales incentives, compared with less cost-eﬃcient
ﬁrms. This eﬀect is increasing in the degree of asymmetry, c.I no t h e r
words, lower relative costs imply more ‘aggressive’ managers. This
means that the use of managerial contracts reinforces the asymmetry
which is initially caused by diﬀerent marginal production costs.16
The incentive for strategic delegation arises because it can be used as
a device for an owner to commit her manager to a higher level of output,
which then serves to deter output from rival ﬁrms. The beneﬁts of output
deterrence are twofold. Firstly, market shares are captured from rival
ﬁrms, and this eﬀect is positively related to the marginal production
costs of these ﬁrms. Secondly, the output contraction of rival ﬁrms also
leads to a price increase, which raises the ﬁrm’s revenues in proportion
to the level of output produced by the ﬁrm. Consequently, the incentives
for strategic delegation are stronger for a low-cost ﬁrm, which initially
enjoys a larger share of the market.
5 The equilibrium ownership structure
In order to assess how the use of managerial delegation aﬀects private
incentives for horizontal merger, we use the case of entrepreneurial ﬁrms
as the benchmark.
Proposition 1 I nt h ec a s eo fe n t r e p r e n e u r i a lﬁrms, the EOS is
(i) M0 if c ≤ a
29,













16This result is found in Fersthman and Judd (1987), and is also indicated by Das
(1997) in a diﬀerent setting.
8The proof is given in Appendix B.
In the absence of delegation, the merger process results in either no
merger, or a merger involving the least cost-eﬃcient ﬁrm, depending on
the degree of cost asymmetry in the industry.
>From the existing literature on horizontal merger we know that
in a model of Cournot competition in homogeneous goods with linear
demand, a suﬃcient degree of cost-saving is necessary to make a two-ﬁrm
merger proﬁtable. If c =0we have a completely symmetric industry
structure. In this case a merger is never privately proﬁtable, as ﬁrst
shown by Salant et al. (1983).17 In order for the rationalisation gain from
a merger to be large enough to compensate for the aggressive response
by the outside ﬁrm, and thus make a merger proﬁtable, the degree of
cost asymmetry must be suﬃciently high. Consequently, for a low degree
of cost asymmetry, c< a
29, the decentralised structure, with no merger,
is the unique equilibrium.
For c ≥ a
29,a tl e a s to n et y p eo fm e r g e ri sp r o ﬁtable for the partici-
pants. Within the relevant range (c<c), the potential cost saving from
am e r g e r ,d u et oam o r ee ﬃcient allocation of production, is increasing
in the degree of cost asymmetry. The cost-saving potential can partly be
realised through any type of merger, but the eﬃciency gain is larger in a
merger with the least eﬃcient ﬁrm. Thus, when several types of merger
are proﬁtable, the equilibrium ownership structure is determined by total
industry proﬁts, which are higher in the market structure which yields
the more eﬃcient allocation of production.
If ﬁrms engage in strategic delegation, the private incentives for
merger change quite dramatically, as illustrated by the following Propo-
sition:
Proposition 2 I nt h ec a s eo fm a n a g e r i a lﬁrms, the EOS is
(i) MB or MC if c ≤ 2a
39,






The proof is given in Appendix C.
A corollary of Proposition 2 is that a merger is always proﬁtable in
the delegation regime. This mirrors the results in González-Maestre and
López-Cuñat (2001) and Ziss (2001), who ﬁnd that the use of managerial
delegation will generally increase the proﬁtability of horizontal mergers
in symmetric Cournot industries.
17When products are homogeneous, the aggressive response from the outside ﬁrm
i st o os t r o n gt om a k eat w o - ﬁrm merger proﬁtable. Such a merger could be prof-
itable, however, if products are suﬃciently diﬀerentiated, as shown by Lommerud
and Sørgard (1997).
9A useful intuition for this result, which is by no means straightfor-
ward, is provided by Ziss (2001): a merger induces an output contraction
by the merging parties. By reducing output by x units the merger par-
ticipants lose proﬁts on those x units, but obtain higher prices, and thus
ah i g h e rp r o ﬁt margin, on the remaining units. In the delegation regime,
pre-merger proﬁtm a r g i n sa r el o w e rd u et oam o r ea g g r e s s i v eb e h a v i o u r
in the production sub-game. This improves the proﬁtability of a merger,
compared with the case of entrepreneurial ﬁrms, since it lowers the lost
proﬁts on the x units that are no longer produced by the merging parties.
Obviously, with asymmetric ﬁrms the proﬁtability of a merger is fur-
ther increased, due to the rationalisation eﬀect. In fact, any type of
merger is always proﬁtable when ﬁrms use strategic delegation. Fur-
thermore, Proposition 2 indicates that, contrary to the case of entrepre-
neurial ﬁrms, a merger between the two most cost-eﬃcient ﬁr m si st h e
equilibrium outcome of the merger process if the degree of cost asym-
metry is suﬃciently high.
The intuition can be traced to the eﬀect of cost asymmetry on the
optimal delegation contracts. We have seen that managerial delegation
reinforces the initial cost asymmetry, implying that the two most cost-
eﬃcient ﬁrms have a larger share of the market in the pre-merger, and are
thus stronger competitors, compared with the entrepreneurial case. If
the degree of cost asymmetry is suﬃciently high, this implies further that
a merger between the two strongest ﬁrms allows the merged entity to en-
joy a near-monopoly position in the market, which yields higher industry
proﬁts than a situation with two more equal competitors post-merger.
Consequently, strategic delegation strengthens the anti-competitive in-
centive for merger, relative to the cost-saving incentive.
6 Social versus private incentives for merger
When a merger results in a more eﬃcient allocation of production, such a
merger may also increase social welfare. It is thus interesting to compare
the equilibrium ownership structure with the socially most preferred
ownership structure, in order to establish the correspondence between
social and private incentives for merger.
Let W(Mi) denote social welfare, measured as the sum of produc-
ers’ and consumers’ surplus, in ownership structure Mi.I f W(Mi) >
W(Mj) we say that Mi is socially preferred to Mj, expressed as Mi Â
Mj.S i n c e W(MB)=W(MC) we will refer to this particular market
structure as MB. Once more, we use the case of entrepreneurial ﬁrms
as a benchmark. In this case, a simple comparison of welfare in the
10diﬀerent ownership structures yields the following result:18
Proposition 3 I nt h ec a s eo fe n t r e p r e n e u r i a lﬁrms, the social ranking
of market structures is given by
(i) M0 ÂM B ÂM A if c< 7a
107,






A merger has two contrasting eﬀects on social welfare. A higher
market concentration implies higher prices and thus increased market
distortion. On the other hand, a more eﬃcient allocation of production
will have a positive cost-reducing eﬀect. For the second eﬀect to domi-
nate, the degree of cost asymmetry must be suﬃciently high. In this case
a merger involving the least cost-eﬃcient ﬁrm, i.e. MB, is the socially
preferred ownership structure.
A merger between the two most cost-eﬃcient ﬁrms, however, does not
increase social welfare, even if the cost structure is relatively asymmetric.
T h er e a s o ni st w o f o l d :i fc is relatively low, the rationalisation gain from
the merger is not suﬃciently large. On the other hand, if c is relatively
high, MA is a highly concentrated market structure, due to the large cost
diﬀerence between the ﬁrms. Consequently, the price increase more than
outweighs the cost-savings, from a viewpoint of social welfare. In fact,
Proposition 3 conﬁrms that MA is the socially least preferred market
structure for all c<c.
If owners use strategic delegation, a similar comparison of welfare
in the diﬀerent ownership structures reveal a slightly diﬀerent social
ranking.
Proposition 4 In the case of managerial ﬁrms, the social ranking of
market structures is given by M0 ÂM B ÂM A for all c<c.
W es e et h a tam e r g e rb e t w e e nt h et w om o s tc o s t - e ﬃcient ﬁrms is
always the socially least preferred ownership structure, whether or not
the owners use strategic delegation, and the intuition is similar for both
cases. The only diﬀerence between the two regimes in terms of social
ranking of ownership structures, is that the decentralised structure is
always preferred under managerial delegation, even for high degrees of
cost asymmetry. This is mainly due to the fact that the low-cost ﬁrms’
shares of total industry output are greater when owners use strategic
delegation, which means that production is more eﬃciently allocated
in this case. Consequently, the scope for eﬃciency-enhancing merger is
lower.
18See Appendix A for an explicit derivation of welfare in the diﬀerent ownership
structures.
11Having established the social ranking of ownership structures, we can
now use the results from the previous section to examine the relationship
between private and social incentives for horizontal merger.
Proposition 5 In the case of entrepreneurial ﬁrms, the equilibrium own-
ership structure coincides with the socially most preferred ownership
structure if c ≤ a





.I fﬁrms are managerial, the equilib-
rium ownership structure never coincides with the socially most preferred
ownership structure.
The proof follows from Propositions 1-4.
The degree of correspondence between private and social incentives
f o rm e r g e ri sh i g h l yd e p e n d e n to nw h e t h e ro rn o to w n e r su s es t r a t e g i c
delegation. In the absence of delegation, the equilibrium outcome of
the merger process coincides with the socially most preferred outcome
if the industry is characterised by either a relative low or a relative
high degree of cost asymmetry. In the ﬁrst case, a merger will not
be undertaken because it is not proﬁtable, whereas in the second case,
the rationalisation gain from the merger that arises in equilibrium is
suﬃciently large for this ownership structure to dominate the others,
from a viewpoint of social welfare.
In the delegation regime, on the other hand, the merger process al-
ways fails to produce the socially most preferred outcome. Furthermore,
unless the degree of cost asymmetry is very low, a comparison of Propo-
sitions 2 and 4 reveals that the equilibrium outcome under delegation
is the least preferred ownership structure, namely a merger between the
two most cost-eﬃcient ﬁrms.
There are two aspects of strategic delegation which contribute to
the large discrepancy between private and social incentives for merger.
Firstly, the use of delegation generally increases the proﬁtability of merger.
Am e r g e ri sp r o ﬁtable under delegation even if it entails no cost-savings.
Secondly, the use of delegation also increases the probability that the
‘wrong’ type of merger is formed. This is due to the fact that delegation
reinforces the cost-based asymmetry in the industry, which reduces the
potential rationalisation gain from a merger and means that the merger
process to a larger extent is motivated by a quest for increased market
power.
7C o n c l u d i n g r e m a r k s
Because of potential discrepancies between private and social incentives
f o rm e r g e r ,t h em a r k e tc a ng e n e r a l l yn o tb er e l i e du p o nt op r o d u c et h e
socially most preferred market structure. This provides a rationale for
12antitrust policy, and illustrates the importance of understanding the
relationship between private and social merger incentives. In this paper
we have concentrated attention towards the internal organisation of ﬁrms
as a key factor in this relationship.
Comparing the cases of entrepreneurial and managerial ﬁrms, we
have shown that the use of strategic delegation signiﬁcantly distorts the
incentives for horizontal merger: ﬁrstly, by increasing the probability
that a merger will take place, and, secondly, by also increasing the prob-
ability that the merger process leads to the wrong type of merger, from
a viewpoint of social welfare.
There are at least two ways to interpret our results in relation to an-
titrust policy. In this paper we have contrasted two alternative models of
the ﬁrm: the entrepreneurial and the managerial model. Without com-
mitting to any particular stance regarding the relevance of either model,
our results suggest that if the managerial model is the more appropri-
ate description of actual ﬁrm behaviour, then the scope for antitrust
policy is considerably larger than what is suggested by the established
literature on horizontal merger, which is predominantly based on the
entrepreneurial model.
Alternatively, we can view the two models not as competing models,
but as models with diﬀerent applicability to diﬀerent types of industries.
Our results then suggest that antitrust authorities should pay particular
attention to this aspect in the evaluation of the social desirability of a
proposed merger.
In characterising the correspondence between private and social in-
centives for horizontal merger, generality is hard to obtain. Firstly, there
is a number of potential sources of eﬃciency gains that can be realised
through a merger. Secondly, a prediction of the outcome of an endoge-
nous merger process is required, which necessitates a fair amount of
structure to be imposed on the analysis. Consequently, the scope of any
such analysis must necessarily be restricted by a certain degree of partic-
ularity in the assumptions. The present paper is certainly no exception
in this respect. Nevertheless, our main results are driven by a mechanism
that we believe to be fairly general: in Cournot industries, cost-based
asymmetries between ﬁrms are reinforced by the use of strategic dele-
gation, which strengthens anti-competitive incentives for merger. Thus,
we believe that the main message of the paper generalises beyond the
rather stylised structure of our model.
13A Equilibrium outcomes in the diﬀerent ownership
structures
Solving the game by backwards induction, we derive the following ex-
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[a +( 1 9− 10i)c]




























































Deﬁning social welfare as the sum of consumers’ and producers’ surplus,









Using (A.1)-(A.16), social welfare in the diﬀerent ownership structures
























































2 − 12ac +2 8 c
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(A.23)
B Proof of Proposition 1
Comparing any type of merger with the decentralised ownership struc-
ture, the decisive group of owners consists of the merger participants.
From (A.2) and (A.4), we ﬁnd that πe
1+2 (MA) > [πe
1 (M0)+πe
2 (M0)],
implying MA dom M0,i fc> a
13. From (A.2) and (A.7) we ﬁnd that
πe
1+3 (MB) > [πe
1 (M0)+πe
3 (M0)],i m p l y i n gMB dom M0,i fc> a
29.
From (A.2) and (A.8) we ﬁnd that πe
2+3 (MC) > [πe
2 (M0)+πe
3 (M0)],
implying MC dom M0,i fc> a
17. For values of c below the critical lev-
els, the dominance relations are reversed. When comparing two diﬀerent
types of merger, all owners are decisive. In this case the dominance re-
lation is determined by a comparison of total industry proﬁts in the







πe (MA) for all c<c.T h u s ,MB
and MC, which are identical market structures, always dominate MA.
15The pairwise comparison of ownership structures show that M0 is un-
dominated for c< a













C Proof of Proposition 2
Comparing any type of merger with the decentralised ownership struc-
ture, the decisive group of owners consists of the merger participants.




2 (M0)] for all c<c, πm
1+3 (MB) > [πm
1 (M0)+πm
3 (M0)]
for all c<c and πm
2+3 (MC) > [πm
2 (M0)+πm
3 (M0)] for all c<c.T h u s ,
M0 is always dominated by any other ownership structure. When com-
paring two diﬀerent types of merger, all owners are decisive. In this case
the dominance relation is determined by a comparison of total industry





πm(MC) for all c<c. Furthermore, from







39, the dominance relation is reversed.
Consequently, MA dominates MB and MC, which are identical market
structures, if c>2a
39. The pairwise comparison of ownership structures
show that MB and MC are undominated for c<2a
39, while MA is un-
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